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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
PATRICK JAMES BAILEY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

No. 43143
Kootenai County Case No.
CR-2014-20253
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Bailey failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
when it sentenced him to life with seven years determinate upon his conviction for lewd
conduct with his 10-year-old, severely autistic daughter?
ARGUMENT
Bailey Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Bailey’s girlfriend Linda caught him sexually abusing his “autistic, non-verbal” 10-

year-old daughter A.B. by laying on her and rubbing his bare and erect penis against
her clothed vaginal area and stomach. (R., pp. 9-10, 12-13.) She reported the sexual
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abuse to school officials, who had maintained “suspicions” for about a year that A.B.
was “possibly … a victim of abuse.” (R., pp. 9, 11.) In a confrontation phone call by
Linda, Bailey stated that he had been looking at pornography and masturbating in his
room when A.B. came in and “it escalated from there.”

(R., p. 11.)

Bailey later

admitted rubbing his bare, erect penis against A.B. outside her clothing and putting her
hand on his bare, erect penis. (R., p. 13.) He also admitted having had sexual contact
with A.B. on four prior occasions within the past year. (R., p. 13.)
The state charged Bailey with five counts of lewd conduct against A.B. (R., pp.
29-31.) Bailey and the state entered a plea agreement whereby he pled guilty to one
count and the others were dismissed. (R., pp. 34-38.) The district court imposed a
sentence of life with seven years determinate. (R., pp. 48-51.) Bailey filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp. 57-59.) Bailey also filed a motion to reduce his sentence,
which the district court denied. (Augmentation.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard

considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001)
(citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
2

C.

Bailey Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must

establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.
State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To establish that the
sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of
protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

Id.

In determining

whether the appellant met his burden, the court considers the entire sentence but,
because the decision to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the
executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual
incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007). To prevail on a Rule 35 motion, a defendant must show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to
the district court in support of the motion. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 484-85,
272 P.3d 417, 456-57 (2012).
The record shows that Bailey on multiple occasions over at least one year
sexually molested his pre-teen daughter, who is severely autistic (to the point of being
non-verbal). (Tr., p. 9, L. 13 – p. 10, L. 19; PSI, pp. 27, 31, 64.) All of the abuse
occurred when other family members were out of the house. (R., p. 31.) Some of the
abuse occurred in conjunction with Bailey checking or changing A.B.’s diaper. (R., pp.
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31, 64.) Bailey’s criminal record includes one prior felony (burglary, in Oregon) with a
probation violation, and seven prior misdemeanors including unauthorized use of a
vehicle, driving under the influence, and assault. (PSI, pp. 11-13.) The abuse had a
severe adverse effect on A.B., manifesting in destructive tantrums and abnormal sexual
behaviors such as masturbating to certain children’s movies, which she likely
associates with sexual contact by Bailey. (PSI, pp. 33-35; Tr., p. 13, L. 6 – p. 16, L. 7.)
The district court stated that “it’s the facts of this case that cause [it] to impose
[its] sentence.”

(Tr., p. 53, L. 25 – p. 54, L. 22.)

Specifically, the district court

concluded the abuse was “predatory” at worst and “at best opportunistic but still
premeditated.” (Tr., p. 59, Ls. 9-21.) It also determined that the damage Bailey caused
to A.B. was severe. (Tr., p. 60, Ls. 1-5.) The district court cited both its doubt that
Bailey was a candidate for rehabilitation outside the prison setting and the need for
punishment as particular grounds for its sentence. (Tr., p. 59, L. 19 – p. 60, L. 3.)
Because of the heinous, damaging nature of this crime, concluding that Bailey should
serve seven years before being released on parole, which will last his life, is a
reasonable sentence that balances the goals of sentencing.
Bailey asserts that the district court made several clearly erroneous factual
findings. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-23.) Review of the record shows Bailey’s assertions
to be without merit.
Bailey first claims clear error in the court’s rejection of his claim that he passed
out upon being caught molesting A.B. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-15.) Bailey claims it is
“undisputed” that he had been drinking before and it was “undisputed” that he passed
out and “there is no substantial, competent evidence to support the district court’s
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finding that Mr. Bailey did not pass out.” (Id.) At the sentencing hearing, however,
Linda testified that when she caught Bailey sexually molesting their daughter “he did not
seem to be [intoxicated].” (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 3-5.) Because of this testimony Bailey does
not dispute the finding that he was not intoxicated. (Appellant’s brief, p. 15, n.12.)
Bailey’s claim that the court should have accepted his claim that he passed out from
intoxication—while simultaneously accepting the finding that he was not intoxicated—
makes no sense. Because the district court properly rejected the reason Bailey claimed
he passed out, it was perfectly proper to reject the claim that he in fact passed out.
Bailey has failed to show clear error.
Bailey next finds fault in the district court’s conclusion that Bailey’s repeated
sexual abuse of a 10-year-old autistic girl was “predatory.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 1519.) This argument is entirely semantic. One definition of the word “predatory” in the
Merriam-Webster online dictionary is “wrongly harming or using others for pleasure or
profit.” Of course Bailey’s repeated acts of sexually molesting his severely autistic 10year-old daughter can be fairly characterized as “predatory.”
Bailey next attacks the district court’s “implicit” finding that Bailey sexually
victimized A.B. on more than five occasions. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-21.) Far from
lacking in evidence, the evidence supports an “explicit” finding that Bailey minimized the
number of molestation events.

The five molestation events Bailey admitted to the

police included three incidents of having A.B. manually touch his penis, one incident of
clothed genital frottage, and one incident of frottage using his exposed penis. (PSI, p.
31.)

The five incidents described in the psychosexual evaluation included three

incidents of clothed frottage, one incident of having A.B. manually touch his exposed
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penis, and one incident of frottage using his exposed penis. (PSI, pp. 64-65.) Bailey
told the police that four of the incidents happened in A.B.’s bedroom and one in the
master bedroom. (PSI, p. 31.) He told the psychosexual evaluator that one happened
on the couch, two happened in A.B.’s room and two happened in the master bedroom.
(PSI, pp. 64-65.) Bailey’s wildly different accounts of what abuse happened and where
easily support the conclusion that he was not describing the same five events.
Although he both times claimed there were five events, he in fact described at least
eight different acts of molestation. Combined with its power to make credibility
determinations (and thus reject Bailey’s claim of only five acts of molestation because
Bailey is not credible), the district court was well within its bounds to conclude that
Bailey was minimizing the amount of sexual contact he had with A.B.
Bailey challenges the district court’s statement, “‘I don’t think there is any hope of
rehabilitating you in society.’” (Appellant’s brief, p. 21 (citing Tr., p. 59, Ls. 20-21).)
Bailey also challenges the district court’s rejection of psychosexual evaluator Wyatt’s
opinion that Bailey was a moderate to low risk to reoffend because the “psychological
testing” was “unrebutted.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-23.)

Determinations regarding

rehabilitation and risk of re-offending are not factual findings, but are instead opinions
on future events. Unlike determining whether a past event occurred, predicting whether
a future event will occur is not a factual finding, but instead an opinion. Moreover,
Bailey’s argument that the district court had to adopt Mr. Wyatt’s opinion that Bailey
was treatable in the community because it “was not rebutted by the State” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 21; see also p. 23), is directly contrary to the applicable legal standard. See,
e.g., Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 78, 644 P.2d 1333, 1337 (1982) (“weighing the
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testimony of expert witnesses is uniquely within the competence of the trier of fact”).
Bailey has shown no abuse of discretion in determining his rehabilitation potential
outside of prison.
Even if Bailey had shown one or more clearly erroneous factual finding, any error
regarding factual findings was harmless. See State v. Clark, 146 Idaho 483, 484, 197
P.3d 796, 797 (Ct. App. 2008) (“any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded”). The district court clearly based its
sentence upon the egregiousness of the crime and the harm to the victim (Tr., p. 53, L.
23 – p. 54, L. 22), to the point of declaring that the same sentence would have been
imposed based on the “events in question” regardless of whether Bailey was a low risk
to reoffend (Tr., p. 59, Ls. 22-25). Because the egregious nature of Bailey’s acts is
undisputed, Bailey’s quibbling about the factual margins of this case fails to show that a
lesser sentence was any sort of realistic possibility. Bailey has failed to show error in
the factual findings, but even if he had any error was harmless.
Finally, Bailey has shown no abuse of discretion on the facts found by the district
court.

His argument amounts to an assertion that the district court should have

accepted Wyatt’s conclusions and given Bailey a chance to rehabilitate outside of
prison under a shorter overall sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-26.) Even if Wyatt’s
opinion were adopted by the district court (which it was not), and even if a shorter or a
suspended sentence would have been reasonable (the state submits they would not
have been), Bailey’s argument fails to show that “reasonable minds could not conclude
the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.” Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.
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It is hard to imagine a more vulnerable victim than A.B. A parent abandoning his
duty to protect his vulnerable child and instead repeatedly preying upon her vulnerability
is incomprehensible. A sentence of seven years to life is far below what the court could
have imposed and still been deemed reasonable. Bailey has failed to show an abuse
of sentencing discretion in the sentence or in denial of his Rule 35 motion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district
court and the denial of the motion to reduce the sentence.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2016.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
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